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An Inventory Decision Model of BOPS Retailing Considering 
Cross-selling 
Yongmei Liu*, Bo Kuang, Chen Fan 
School of Business, Central South University, Changsha, 410083, China 
 
Abstract: Omnichannel retailing has been getting more and more attention as people’s buying habits become more diverse. 
BOPS (Buy-on-line, Pick-up-in store) is an important pattern of Omnichannel retailing which has significant impacts on a 
cross-selling effect and inventory decisions. This paper explores this implementation with cross-selling from a perspective of 
inventory management by developing and analyzing a mathematical model based on EOQ model. After series of numerical 
experiments, we found that firms in a perfectly competitive market have motivations to launch BOPS services in most cases, 
especially when the supply chain structure is centralized. Furthermore, in a decentralized supply chain, if the manufacturer 
bears the inventory costs generated in B&M stores according to the proportion of BOPS sales when the inventory capacity is 
not big enough, the retailer can shift a part of costs to the manufacturer by deliberately making biased inventory decisions, 
and this cost shifting may damage the manufacturer’s motivation to implement BOPS where the cross-selling effect is 
powerful enough. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of Internet-based, especially Mobile-Internet-based E-commerce, omnichannel 
retailing becomes more and more widespread [1, 2]. Omnichannel retailing means that retailers take integration 
strategies for online channels and traditional brick-and-mortar (B&M) channels to give consumers a seamless 
shopping experience[3-5], and the “buy-online, pick-up-in-store” (BOPS) project is one of the ways to accomplish 
it. With a BOPS project, consumers can view, choose and purchase the products they need online, and then pick 
up them at the nearest stores of the retailer whenever they are free [6]. 
BOPS actually makes two differences. On one hand, the pressure from inventory of the B&M stores is 
higher, which implies higher inventory cost; on the other hand, more consumers come to B&M stores, which 
usually means greater consumption potential---people who come to the stores for picking up products they 
bought online may casually buy something else, and such phenomena are generally called cross-selling [7, 8]. 
These two changes have totally opposite impacts on profits of the firms, and it is necessary to build a 
mathematic model to describe the issue and explore the details and features of it. We try to answer these 
questions that 1) under what conditions can the BOPS service be implemented? 2) How would the firms’ 
optimal inventory decisions adapt to the changes of external conditions? 3) What are their profits under the 
optimal decisions? 
Reviewing the literature, omnichannel retailing was first proposed by Darrell Rigby in Harvard Business 
Review at 2011 where he described the omnichannel retailing as a trend which retailers must follow to survive 
the revolution of e-commerce[1]. Then some scholars joined the discussion---David Bell posted several 
commentaries in MIT Sloan Management Review to discuss the importance of omnichannel retailing mainly 
from the perspectives of the shortages of pure e-commerce and why online retailers need to develop offline 
channels[2, 3]; Erik Brynjolfsson et al. also thought that omnichannel retailing is an inevitable trend[4]; James 
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Rowell pointed out that an integrated omnichannel retailing is the most competitive one among all existent 
retailing patterns[5]. 
Besides these commentaries, some empirical studies were also conducted---David Bell et al. made 
comparison of three patterns of retailing by analyzing data from a fashion eyewear retailer WarbyParker.com, 
and found that consumers would take their chances to choose appropriate channels according to their 
requirements of product information[8]; Santiago Gallino et al. studied two different patterns of omnichannel 
retailing in two researches, one of which revealed that Ship-To-Store (STS) can significantly increase sales 
dispersion and, however, translate into higher inventories and operational costs[7]. Another research of them 
proposed the concept of BOPS and found that BOPS can lead to cross-selling effect and channel-shift effect[6]. 
Stephen Mahar et al. were also interested in BOPS and, moreover, the return demand of consumers, they 
developed a mathematical model to find that not all retail stores should be offering in-store pickups and/or 
returns, and optimizing the set of pickup and return locations may reduce system cost over baseline marketing 
policies[9]. 
From all researches mentioned above, we can see that previous researchers focused on demonstrating the 
necessity and studying the different impacts of the omnichannel retailing in different patterns, including BOPS, 
and most of them went in empirical ways. Until now, few scholars have tried to analyze the retailer’s decision 
making problems as they have being placed in an omnichannel retailing environment, which we think are worth 
researching as the omnichannel retailing is becoming the ordinary. 
In this paper, we present an inventory decision model to characterize a basic situation of a BOPS project 
for a certain product, considering cross-selling on another. Our inventory model is based on the well-known 
Economic-Order-Quantity (EOQ) model[10], and two kinds of supply chain structure are considered, i.e. 
centralization and decentralization, the former of which means that a supplier or a big retailer (collectively 
referred to as an omnichannel retailer hereinafter) takes control of both online and offline channels and makes 
decisions for maximizing the overall profit of supply chain; the latter means that the manufacturer has his own 
online channel while the retailer controls B&M stores, and both of them run for their own profits. This schema 
of model construction is based on the experiences of previous researches in the field of dual-channel or hybrid 
channels supply chain[11, 12]. 
By series of numerical experiments, we found that 1) whether omnichannel retailers in centralized supply 
chain or manufacturers and retailers in decentralized one have motivations to launch BOPS services in most 
cases as the BOPS is getting more and more demand, and in addition, omnichannel retailers are more adaptable; 
2) in a decentralized supply chain, if the manufacturer bears the inventory costs of the certain product generated 
in B&M stores according to the proportion of BOPS sales while the storehouse’s capacity is not big enough, the 
retailer can shift a part of costs to the manufacturer by deliberately biased inventory decision making, and this 
costs shifting could damage the manufacturer’s initiative of launching BOPS project if the cross-selling effect is 
powerful enough. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model and presents the solving 
method. Section 3 analyzes the model by numerical experiments. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND SOLUTION 
2.1 Assumptions 
We discuss a situation that two products are sold through two distribution channels in a perfectly 
competitive market. As presents in Figure 1, Product 1 is sold in both two channels and faces three types of 
consumers---traditional offline consumers only buy products in the B&M store, traditional online consumers 
buy products online and their orders are sent out from online channel directly, BOPS consumers purchase online  
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but pick up their products in the B&M store. The supplier of Product 1 is who controls the online channel. 
However, Product 2 is sold in the B&M store only as its source of supply is ignored, and besides its inherent 
demand in the market, the consumers coming to the store for Product 1 (buying or just picking up) may bring 
unexpected demand. 
We suppose that the demand rates of both products are predictable and constant, and all lead-times are 
supposed to be zero as our model is developed based on EOQ model. For Product 1, being out of stock is 
obviously not allowed in the B&M store if BOPS project is implemented, so a standard EOQ model is 
applicable. As for Product 2, planned backorders are permitted and the penalty cost for one unit backordered 
during one time-unit is assumed to be constant. Besides, The B&M store have one storehouse with limited 
capacity for these two products. 
Because of the perfect competition, the prices of both products are exogenous, and Product 1’s prices in 
different distribution channel are the same. When the supply chain is decentralized, of course the revenue from 
the pieces of Product 1 picked up by BOPS consumers belongs to the manufacturer, so the manufacturer should 
pay the resulting inventory cost to the retailer who actually manages the inventory of Product 1 in the B&M 
store; As for other pieces of Product 1 that bought by traditional offline consumers, the retailer should pay an 
exogenous wholesale price to the manufacturer for them and bear the inventory cost generated by them. 
Moreover, except inventory cost, all other costs are assumed to be zero. 
2.2 Application of EOQ models 
For the demand structure, let 1a  and 2a  denote the basic demand rates of Product 1 and 2 respectively; 
1 1rD aθ= , ( )1 11bD aθ β= − , ( ) ( )1 11 1mD aθ β= − −  denote the demand rates of Product 1’s traditional offline 
consumers, BOPS consumers, and traditional online consumers; ( )2 2 1 1r bD a D Dη= + +  denotes the actual 
demand rate of product 2 after considering the cross-selling effect, where η  is the measurement of the efficacy 
of cross-selling effect. 
As for the inventory issue, given 1, 2i =  representing the two products, iq  denotes the order quantity for 
Product i , is  denotes the maximum stock level of Product i , iv  denotes the inventory space each single 
Product i  occupies, ik  denotes the fixed ordering cost for each order of Product i , ih  denotes the holding 
cost for each single Product i  in unit time, and ib  denotes the backorder cost for each single Product i  in 
unit time. And all parameters above are supposed to be non-negative. 
If BOPS project is implemented on Product 1, according to the standard EOQ model, 1 1s q=  always holds 
in optimal strategies, and the inventory cost in unit time for Product 1 is  
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 1
1 2
r bk D D h sC s
s
+
= + .             (1) 
The EOQ model with planned backorders is applicable to Product 2, and the inventory cost is 
Figure 1. The case of BOPS project considering cross-selling 
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( ) ( )
22





b s qk D h sC s q
q q q
−
= + + .                (2) 
However, if no BOPS project is implemented, Model (2) is also suitable for Product 1, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )
22





r bk D D b s qh sC s q
q q q
+ −
′ = + + .            (3) 
In order to be more realistically, all decision variables, i.e. 1s , 1q , 2s  and 2q , are required to be 
integers. 
 
2.3 Decision models and profits 
In a centralized supply chain, the omnichannel retailer makes inventory decisions to maximize its profit. 
Since the prices of both products are exogenous (denoted by 1p  and 2p  separately) and all other costs are 
assumed to be zero, maximizing the profit is equivalent to minimizing the inventory cost. Hence the model of 
the omnichannel retailer’s decision is  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 2
min , , ,
. .
, ,
cC s s q C s C s q
v s v s Vs t





　 .              (4) 
Note that V  denotes the storage capacity of the B&M store and the first constraint insures that the 
inventory space is enough even when these two products’ stocks reach their peaks at the same time. However, 
( )1 1C s  should be replaced with ( )1 1 1C s q′ ,  when no BOPS project has been launched, and accordingly, 1q  
need to be added into the decisions, the same to following models. 
In a decentralized supply chain, since the manufacturer bears a part of Product 1’s inventory cost, the 
retailer’s decision model turns into 
( ) ( ) ( )11 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 2 2






DC s s q C s C s q
D D
v s v s Vs t
s s q N
⎛ ⎞





.    (5) 
Regardless of the details of decision model, we use ( )1 2 2, ,s s q∗ ∗ ∗  to denote the optimal decision. Therefore, 
in the centralized supply chain, the omnichannel retailer’s profit under optimal decision is  
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2, ,c r b m cp D D D p D C s s q∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Π = + + + − .         (6) 
While in the decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailer respectively get profits as following 
( 1wp  denotes the whole price of Product 1 where [0,1]w∈ ): 
( ) ( )11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
b
m r b m
r b
Dwp D p D D C s
D D
∗ ∗⎛ ⎞Π = + + − ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
,       (7) 
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2 21 , ,r r dw p D p D C s s q∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Π = − + − .             (8) 
2.4 Solutions 
How to get 1 2 2, ,s s q
∗ ∗ ∗（ ） is the remaining question. Due to the fractional objective functions and the integer 
constraints, it is hard to figure out analytical solutions, so we take the second choice and provide a method to 
find out the numerical solutions of the decision models above. It is easy to observe that Model (4) and (5) share 
the same structure, so the following method is applicable to both of them. 
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Firstly, there is no constraint on 2q  except being integer, so if we ignore this constraint, the analytical 
optimal solution of 2q  can be easily obtained as the objective function is a convex function of 2q , i.e. 
( ) 22 2 2 22 2 2
2 2
2b h k Dq s s
b b
∗ += + .         (9) 
And then considering the integer constraint, the optimal solution of 2q  must be the maximum integer 
which is not greater than 2 2( )q s
∗  or the minimum integer which is not less than that as long as the value of 2s  
has been given. We use 2 2( )q s
∗  to denote the optimal integral value of 2q . 
Secondly, when all constraints are ignored, the analytical optimal solution of 1s  is 
( )1 1 1
1
1
2 r bk D Ds
h
∗ += .             (10) 
Similarly, we can find the optimal 1s
∗  around 1s
∗  considering the integer constraint. However, different 
from 2q , the value of 1s  must follow the store capacity constraint, so given any 2s , the optimal solution of 
1s  should be 
( ) 2 21 2 1
1
min , V v ss s s
v
∗ ∗⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥−⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥
⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
.        (11) 
In summary, given any 2 2[0, ]s N V v∈ ∩ , it is easy to find the corresponding optimal solution of 2q  and 
1s , i.e. ( )2 2q s∗  and ( )1 2s s∗ , and then figure out the corresponding objective function value. When every 
possible value of 2s  has been tried, we can find the optimal one (denoted by 1s
∗ ). Then we get the optimal 
solution of the decision model, i.e. ( )1 2 1 2 1, ( ), ( )s s s q s∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . 
Similar method can be taken to solve the decision models without BOPS.  
 
3. ANALYSIS 
To confirm the validity of the models and to study their features, we conducted a series of numerical 
experiments and got some interesting conclusions. Default values of all parameters are showed in Table 1, and 
they were selected to reflect the reality as accurately as possible, and because we don’t take the differences 
between Product 1 and Product 2 into consideration, most characteristics of them are set to be the same. 
 
Table 1.  Basic values of all parameters 
 1,2p  w  1,2a  θ  β  η  1,2k  1,2h  1,2b  1,2v  V  
Product 1 1 0.5 100 0.5 0.5 10 1 5 1 
Product 2 1 -- 100 -- -- 
0.1 
10 1 5 1 
70 
 
3.1 Centralized supply chain 
Let c
∗Π  ( cnb
∗Π ) donates the optimal profit of the omnichannel retailer with (without) BOPS, Figure 2 
shows the comparison of situations with and without BOPS when 0η =  (no cross-selling effect). Region A in 
Figure 2-b means the omnichannel retailer can get more profit by implementing BOPS and Region B means the 
contrary. We can see that even without cross-selling effect, implementing BOPS is the better choice in most 
cases, except when traditional offline consumers make up a large majority of the demand of Product 1, or BOPS 
consumers of Product 1 are quite few.  
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Figure 2.  Comparison of profit with and without BOPS in centralized supply chain (η=0) 
 
Figure 3.  Incentive to implement BOPS in centralized supply chain (η=0) 
 
To check the robustness of this conclusion, Figure 3 shows the results when 1 0.1h =  and 1 3h = , 
respectively represent the situations when Product 1’s holding cost is comparatively low and high. The result 
shows that Region A shrinks when 1h  goes up, that is to say the omnichannel retailer’s motivation to 
implement BOPS can be discouraged by high holding cost. However, considering the price of Product 1 in this 
experiment (i.e. 1 1p = ), 1 1h =  is relatively high comparing to most cases of reality. 
For impacts of the demand structure, with our assumptions of the centralized supply chain, the BOPS 
consumers and the traditional offline consumers have the same effects on cost and profit, thus we put 
( )θ β θβ+ −  as a key parameter of demand structure which denotes the ratio of demands that go to the B&M 
store for Product 1. From Figure 4, the more consumers of Product 1 come to the store, the higher inventory cost 
should be covered, but the profit is not always lower---as long as the cross-selling effect is powerful enough, the 
profit may rises with the increasing of consumers coming to the store. As a result, only when the cross-selling 
effect rises to an extent, the omnichannel retailer can benefit from encouraging consumers of Product 1 to visit 
the B&M store. 
 
Figure 4.  Influences of demand structure on cost and profit in centralized supply chain with BOPS 
 
3.2 Decentralized supply chain 
Firstly, we focus on motivations of the manufacturer and the retailer to implement BOPS. Figure 5-a shows 
the results when 0η = , where Region (A+Br) and Region (A+Bm) respectively mean the retailer and 
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manufacturer have incentives to implement BOPS. However, a BOPS project can be launched only when both 
of them have incentives (Region A). Figure 5-b, c, d show the results when η  takes different values. 
The results in Figure 5 indicate that the retailer’s inclination to implement BOPS will cover more situations 
when cross-selling effect becomes stronger, which need not go into detail. As for the manufacturer, generally 
considering, the cross-selling effect should not impact the manufacturer at all, but Figure 5 shows that an 
extremely high η  will damage the manufacturer’s initiative. To explain this phenomenon, we can find some 
clues in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5.  Incentive to implement BOPS in decentralized supply chain 
 
Figure 6.  Influences of cross-selling effect on profits in decentralized supply chain 
 
From Figure 6-a, we can see that the manufacturer’s profit will drop down when cross-selling effect 
becomes stronger as long as a BOPS project has been launched. Considering that the manufacturer’s revenue 
must be constant, changes do certainly come from the inventory cost of Product 1 for BOPS. By analyzing 
changes of retailer’s optimal inventory decisions, we confirmed that, as cross-selling effect becomes stronger, 
the retailer will deliberately raise the capitation inventory cost of each piece of Product 1 to minimize the part of 
inventory costs he bears, and at the same time the other part of costs that the manufacturer bears increase. 
Because it seems like the retailer shifts some costs to the manufacturer by the inventory cost sharing mechanism 
in a BOPS project, we name this phenomenon as cost-shifting effect. As Figure 5 shows, as long as the 
cross-selling effect is powerful enough, the cost-shifting effect may damage the manufacturer’s motivation to 
implement BOPS, however these critical values of η  in this experiment are quite high comparing to most 
situations in reality. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present a model to describe and analyze the inventory decision problem in a supply chain 
with online and offline distribution channels implementing BOPS, considering the cross-selling effect and a 
storage capacity constraint. We conducted a series of numerical experiments to verify the validity of this model 
and got some interesting conclusions. No matter the supply chain is centralized or decentralized, the sellers have 
incentives to launch a BOPS project in most cases as the BOPS is getting more and more demand, however a 
omnichannel retailer who owns both online and offline channels is more adaptable. In a decentralized supply 
chain, if the manufacturer who owns the online channel bears the inventory costs generated by products for 
BOPS in the B&M store while the storehouse’s capacity is limited, the retailer who owns the B&M store can 
shift a part of costs to the manufacturer by deliberately biased inventory decision making, and such cost-shifting 
effect may damage the manufacturer’s incentive to implement BOPS if the cross-selling effect is strong enough. 
In the following researches, stochastic demand may be considered, and the prices of the related products 
can be assumed endogenous to build a pricing and inventory decision model. 
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